Financial engineers have developed new types of instruments allowing market participants to manage risk and
Government regulators have strong incentives to prevent such failures because if investors worry about the reliability of contracts they will withdraw from financial markets, harming the economy. As outsiders, however, regulators have a difficult time supervising complex, rapidly changing financial technology. The controls within financial firms themselves can be more technically sophisticated, but the incentives for maintaining effective internal controls are fragile; supervisors within financial firms must deal with politically powerful "production offices" that see controls as slowing down profitable business (McCaffrey and Hart 1998). Cooperation among public and private supervisors could elevate the attention paid to internal controls on public interest grounds while drawing on the technical expertise of the private sector, but this requires transcending barriers to collaboration between the sectors. This paper examines how a collaborative effort between the private and public sectors, called the Derivatives Policy Group (DPG), helped shape current regulation of financial innovation. In 1994 and 1995, this group of six large financial firms developed procedures for risk management, internal controls, and reporting for largely unregulated areas of finance, in cooperation with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The process succeeded despite strong competition among the firms themselves and incentives for both the public and private sectors to resort to adversarial lobbying and legal challenges. The DPG was a path-setting event in the development of flexible regulation of financial innovation that has become a norm for policy making The case is important in and of itself-the financial markets are a major concern of national and international economic policy-but here we treat it as an instance of a larger class of problems. Organizational science constantly encounters settings that involve numerous participants who compete or have histories of conflicts; who are interdependent, and collectively would gain, and even individually gain long term, by cooperating rather than competing on an issue; who fall under different governance systems; and who try as a group to design rules and principles governing their behavior (Ostrom 1990 (Ostrom , 1998 . Furthermore, the settings encompass organizations from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors, and the difference in perspectives of the two sectors is both one of the advantages of cooperation and one of the challenges to it (Reinicke 1998 ; and different government agencies try jointly, along with private and nonprofit contractors, to address problems spilling across jurisdictions (Bardach 1998) . It has been difficult to institutionalize these cooperative approaches, but the successes are so worthwhile that efforts to make them routine continue.
Four factors appear repeatedly in the research on the success or failure of such arrangements. These are (1) the initial dispositions toward cooperation, (2) the extant issues and incentives, (3) leadership, and (4) the number and variety of organizations involved (McCaffrey et al. 1995) . This paper focuses on how these factors shaped the development and consequences of the Derivatives Policy Group, and the general implications of this process for interorganizational cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the features of financial markets that set the stage for the DPG. We then present a theoretical framework addressing the determinants of interorganizational cooperation. The paper next reviews the methodology used to collect and examine the data presented here, and then uses the theoretical framework to discuss the conditions facilitating the DPG agreement, as well as the difficulties the group could not overcome. The conclusion examines the case's implications, including the necessity of focusing on the complexity of cooperation's development, and its persistence or failure.
The Benefits and Problems of Financial Innovation
To put the Derivatives Policy Group in context, it is important to understand some key elements of financial markets. Two basic classes of financial instruments are securities and futures. The traditional notion was that securities, generally equities and bonds, were acquired for investment profits, whereas futures contracts were acquired to transfer risk. In a futures contract, a party agrees to pay a certain price for delivery of a commodity or other asset at a designated point in the future. The two contexts for buying and selling financial instruments are exchanges and the over-the-counter (OTC), or off-exchange, markets. Exchanges physically consolidate trading; they include places like the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange (for securities), and the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (for futures). Concentrating trading makes it easier for buyers, sellers, and dealers to find each other and eases regulatory monitoring of trading. The over-the-counter markets, in contrast, are decentralized networks of buyers, sellers, and dealers, not tied to a particular exchange.
The Much of this activity occurred in an over-the-counter derivatives market called the swaps market, which was largely unregulated. Derivatives traded on securities and futures exchanges, and in the regulated over-the-counter market in securities, are standardized and marketed to the general public. Swaps, however, are custom-made agreements between two parties to make periodic payments to each other (or net periodic payments) based on changes in underlying assets, rates, or indices. For example, a party currently paying a fixed interest rate, but preferring a variable rate, effectively can "swap" interest rate payments with another who prefers the fixed rate. By 1994, conventional measures indicated that the volume of activity in OTC derivatives activity exceeded that in exchange-traded derivatives (Securities Industry Association 1999). Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission had tried to regulate swaps as securities or futures because they were not marketed to the general public and were not traded on regulated exchanges. Some people, however, argued that the new market affected the general public so pervasively that it should not remain beyond regulators' reach.
The "Regulatory Gap" and the Controversy over Derivatives. The SEC and CFTC require broker-dealer firms to maintain capital reserves so they can protect customers from a firm's operational default; this capital is not available for profit-making activities. The firms' exposures to OTC swaps transactions counted in computing their capital requirements, but firms argued that applying the standard capital formulas to swaps resulted in excessively 374 high levels of such "unprofitable" reserves being set aside to meet regulations (U.S. General Accounting Office 1998). Firms thus responded by creating subsidiaries which were largely unregulated to carry out their swaps business. The firms defended the arrangements on the grounds that swaps were not marketed to the general public, and so were beyond the SEC's and CFTC's jurisdictions, and that the subsidiaries did not affect regulated operations. But critics cited a "regulatory gap," arguing that the OTC derivatives market was functionally similar to the securities and futures markets and was growing rapidly, and that the subsidiaries indeed did affect the parent firms.
This controversy escalated in 1994. After the Federal Reserve increased interest rates, both private and public institutional investors lost heavily in transactions in exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives sensitive to interest rate movements. Many of these investors, in turn, sued the financial firms involved, and the SEC and CFTC initiated several related enforcement actions (U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1995, U.S. House Committee on Banking and Financial Services 1996).2 In May 1994, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a study of the derivatives market. The GAO wrote that "the largely unregulated activities of U.S. OTC derivatives dealers that are affiliates of securities and insurance companies have been growing rapidly ... If one of these large OTC dealers failed, the failure could pose risks to other firmsincluding federally insured depository institutions-and the financial system as a whole" (1994, pp. 11-12). Legislators then introduced several proposals to tighten regulation of derivatives (Culp and Mackay 1994 Yet the SEC and CFTC did not clearly have the authority to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives markets; the firms had set up the subsidiaries precisely to avoid such regulation. This situation easily could have resulted in a persistent dispute between the agencies and industry. The SEC and CFTC could have pushed Congress for clear legal authority to regulate OTC derivatives, and might have received it because of fears of further financial "disasters." The firms, in turn, could have lobbied hard against the disruption of such proposals.
Instead of fighting this battle, the government and industry developed a new collaborative regulatory approach through the Framework. In addition, the success of the DPG created a period in which the SEC and other financial regulators could craft capital and reporting procedures tailored specifically to the OTC derivatives markets. In 1998, the SEC approved the establishment of lightly regulated derivatives subsidiaries, with strong industry support and no significant opposition from other private sector interests (Bureau of National Affairs 1998). 
Methods
This paper uses a case study approach to develop a deeper understanding of the collaborative process used by the DPG. As such, the data collection and analysis focus on both the broader context and background in which the DPG operated and the collaborative process that allowed for six private sector organizations to work together and to cooperate with two government agencies. The research draws on two sources of data: semistructured interviews with individuals involved in the DPG's origins and implementation; and documents, including Congressional hearings, that describe the DPG's process and/or the types of financial innovations that the DPG was asked to address.
Interviews
Using a snowball sampling approach, in 1997 and 1998, we requested interviews with 21 individuals involved with the DPG or related organizations, including the DPG's key organizers, prominent leaders involved in the financial markets, and individuals in the SEC and CFTC. Of these, 20 agreed to be interviewed. (We should note that the one individual who was not available for an interview referred us to the main member of his staff who worked on the DPG.) These interviews included 11 individuals involved directly in the DPG working groups, the SEC, and the CFTC; three individuals from committees of Congress overseeing financial market regulation; one from the United States General Accounting Office; two attorneys not involved directly in the DPG, but with extensive knowledge of the issues in regulating financial innovation; and three from financial industry associations.4 We believe that we were successful in obtaining interviews with several of these individuals primarily because the DPG's key organizers referred us for the interviews.
As noted above, the interviews were semistructured, 
Data Analysis
As noted in the introduction to this paper, we began with a framework that included four factors that appear repeatedly in studies of collaboration or cooperation-initial dispositions toward cooperation, the extant issues and incentives, leadership, and the number and variety of groups involved. Our primary goal was to explore how each of these factors did or did not play a role in the DPG's collaborative process, as well as whether there were additional factors influencing the process that were not present in the framework. During the data analysis, the notion of interaction between and among factors emerged vividly, and this became an additional theme in the data analysis. Data were analyzed in an iterative process. First, both interview notes and documents were reviewed for both evidence and importance of the four factors and other influencing variables. During the second stage, interview notes and documents were again reviewed for evidence of interaction between and among factors.
Factors Affecting Interorganizational Cooperation
Management studies, political science, economics, and sociology focus on a variety of factors facilitating or inhibiting cooperation. Four factors appear repeatedly across these areas, with authors generally emphasizing one or two. These factors include initial dispositions toward cooperation; the extant issues and incentives; leadership; and the number and variety of groups involved in a task. This section reviews each factor, and then considers their relationships.
Initial Dispositions Toward Cooperation
Initial dispositions toward cooperation, shaped by personal experience and institutions, favor or inhibit cooperation. People are more likely to cooperate when they expect their own "nice" behavior to be rewarded with nice behavior by others (Axelrod 1984) . At least for a time, they will regard setbacks as temporary aberrations not threatening the relationship. When parties do not trust each other initially, however, they worry about making early gestures necessary to increase trust; thus, individuals favoring cooperation will have a hard time selling it as an approach, and fragile successes can be undermined easily by "I told you they can't be trusted" reactions (Gulati 1995, McAllister 1995, Arifio and de la Torre 1998).
First-hand dealings with others partly shape these attitudes-we learn who we can or cannot trust from personal experience. Institutionalized practices, however, also make it more likely that these personal experiences favor cooperation. A history of good-faith negotiations, legal safeguards, and/or established monitors of behavior reduce the risks of being cheated, and increase faith in the process (Ostrom 1990 (Ostrom , 1998 Williamson 1996) . Furthermore, employment practices and social rewards and punishment generally favor those who earn reputations for being "reasonable" or "good people." Thus, people might come to favor cooperation on the basis of calculated self-interest (Williamson 1996) and/or because they accept it as the appropriate way of doing things (March 1999) . Personal experience and institutionalized practices also can inhibit cooperation, as in the case of longstanding adversaries.
Issues and Incentives
Initial dispositions establish a presumption in favor of or against cooperation, but those leanings can change depending on the extant issues and incentives. Using Anthony Giddens' terms (1984), initial dispositions are an important part of a "structure," while the issues and incentives present occasions for the ongoing "structuring" of relationships. People who favor more extensive cooperation emphasize its "pragmatic necessity" in dealing with tighter economic, technological, and social connections ( 
Number and Variety of Groups
The number and variety of groups involved in a task make cooperation more or less likely by affecting group dynamics and the costs of arriving at agreements. Cooperation develops more easily when parties are similar and/ or have personal ties, and when the number of parties is small enough that they can reach and enforce agreements at reasonable cost. It is less likely when group size and diversity introduce so many different perspectives and needs that disagreements can overwhelm potential agreements (Parkhe 1993b, Kumar and Nti 1998, Zaheer et al. 1998 ). Yet, larger numbers and diversity also can facilitate agreements by creating possibilities for bargains among people with different but compatible preferences. Snidal (1995, p. 57) writes, "institutions play an important role in determining the number and character of participants in an issue and thereby mitigate the independent effect of n and actor heterogeneity . . . on institutional performance and cooperation." He concludes that the impact of the number and heterogeneity of participants on collective action depends on the specific types of heterogeneity involved, the nature of the problem, and institutional context. (1998) wrote that empirical studies on cooperation usually omit the majority of their model's critical variables, noting that this is "not due to any simple-minded neglect, but rather to the staggering empirical complexity" of the processes involved (p. 300); "[i]t is much easier to develop and argue for a multi-dimensional, interactive, dynamic, and contextual framework conceptually than to test it empirically" (p. 301). Similarly, Parkhe (1993a) suggested that concepts of trust, reciprocity, opportunism, and forebearance were the foundation of theories of international joint ventures, but the exigencies of large surveys and industry-level analysis required researchers to focus on more measurable phenomena to the neglect of the core concepts. This paper follows up on their arguments by indicating how initial dispositions toward cooperation, incentives and issues, leadership, and group numbers and variety all were fundamentally important in the Derivatives Policy Group's process. We also discuss the interactions among these factors because the data analysis suggested clearly that understanding interorganizational cooperation requires understanding how the elements combine in a particular context.
Relationships Among the Factors

Conditions Facilitating the Derivative Policy Group Agreement
In this section we discuss how the initial dispositions toward cooperation, extant issues and incentives, leadership, and the number and variety of groups involved influenced the Derivative Policy Group's development. We then consider the case's general implications.
Initial Dispositions Toward Cooperation
Initial dispositions reflect both structural and individual levels of behavior. Structures channel behavior in particular ways, making it more likely that certain types of personal relationships will form; thus, the system as a whole may tend to encourage or inhibit cooperation, with these tendencies in turn shaping personal interactions (Giddens 1984 
Issues and Incentives
The individuals we interviewed from both sectors described their reasons for going along with the DPG process. Their incentives differed, and required give and take, but they were compatible. The firms wanted to minimize lawsuits related to derivatives, preempt what they felt would be disruptive direct regulation, and demonstrate that a group of firms could deal with a major regulatory problem. The SEC and CFTC wanted to get a tighter grip on the OTC derivatives market without being asked to implement what they thought would be crude legislation, although they were willing to ask for legislation if the industry was uncooperative.
Industry Incentives: Minimizing Legal Problems and Centralized Regulation. In the 1990s, numerous financial firms faced serious losses and lawsuits because their management controls failed. They accordingly had incentives to improve their management controls, regardless of any regulatory pressures. But while firms might appreciate strong internal controls in principle, they also want to develop products and complete transactions. Financial firms' "producers" are politically strong because they bring in the firms' revenues, and they would rather spend time developing products and completing transactions than instituting controls that slow transactions (McCaffrey and Hart 1998). While the new legal worries certainly gave firms an incentive to improve controls, other factors as well had to strengthen the hands of those inside firms arguing for the improvements. The SEC's and CFTC's Stakes in the DPG. Firms had established largely unregulated subsidiaries to deal in OTC derivatives to avoid current capital requirements which they argued were not tailored to OTC derivatives' nature and therefore tied up excessive amounts of capital in unprofitable reserves (U.S. General Accounting Office 1998). The SEC and CFTC had little legal control over the subsidiaries, but saw the subsidiaries as clearly affecting their regulatory domains. They wanted more information from the subsidiaries than they were receiving in order to keep track of market developments and risks. The agencies also were concerned with how marketing and risk assessment functions overlapped in the subsidiaries, fearing that combining marketing and risk assessment in the same unit in a firm would make it more likely that those selling products (and bringing in revenues) would win internal debates with those responsible for assessing the products' risks and maintaining internal controls. While the tension is pervasive, usually the firms are thoroughly regulated; here, the subsidiaries were relatively unregulated, and so further removed from the agencies' reach.
One individual noted that the SEC Chair, Arthur Levitt, "because he is a very pragmatic person, recognized that something had to change here. Maybe he didn't know how this would play out. However, he sensed that new ground had to be broken." The agency felt that the threat of legislation was useful, but actually asking for legislation was risky. In related Congressional testimony in 1995, Levitt remarked "I have, since I've been at the Commission, studiously tried to avoid asking Congress for anything ... With all due respect, I don't know when we're going to get it or what we're going to wind up with" (U.S. House Committee on Commerce 1996, p. 138). A principal staff person at the SEC for the project told us that Rather than seek legislation, which we weren't sure we could get, we needed more information . . . We had to have better capital/risk evaluation, and have firms deal with the sales practices and fraud issue. (Russo 1994 ). Committees of the Securities Industry Association (SIA) had been working on issues related to derivatives for some time. The committees, however, had serious difficulties producing agreements. In particular, the members did not have the political leverage to get operational departments inside financial firms to cooperate with them. Designing risk assessment procedures required help from firms' risk assessment departments, and these departments did not consider helping SIA committees to be high priority work.
In instigating the DPG's formation, SEC Chair Levitt bypassed the SIA committee structure and directly contacted the CEOs of the major securities firms with derivatives subsidiaries. (One interview reported that Levitt contacted Russo shortly after the address at the Futures Industry Institute, and said, "I just read your speech. Let's do it.") Contacting the CEOs directly communicated to departments within the firms that they had to take the DPG's working groups seriously. One individual familiar with the earlier SIA committees told us:
There was a prior relationship with the SIA started after the SEC's concept release in May of 1993. We put together a derivatives committee for a response in January 1994. Between then and July or August of 1994 there was additional give and The Number and Variety of Groups Involved Some initial dispositions toward cooperation, incentives, and leadership favored the DPG. Yet those we interviewed said that it likely would have failed if substantially more than six major firms and one lead government agency had been involved; in one participant's words, "The probability of failure grows in geometric proportion to the group's size." An SEC official said, "What made it successful was an agency dealing with a smaller group of firms. We kept the group small. The smaller you can get it, the more likely it will work . . . If this had been a situation where five government agencies were involved it would not have happened"; and a former SEC official remarked that, "The biggest issue was that you couldn't get everybody under the tent. If we drew in the banks that would have gotten too big."
The firms and the government settled on new reporting, risk assessment, and internal control procedures. These agreements were not easy. The problem was crafting procedures that would satisfy the SEC and CFTC, but that also were acceptable to the different firms, which had different systems. One central coordinator for the DPG said that firms were asking themselves, What information was really meaningful?" "How close are my systems to generating information required for these objectives?" "What is the right information to look at?" I don't think there is a consensus on these issues. The fact is that there is a lot of legitimate disagreement about these issues . .. It was important to not get married to an approach. [We] went back to the drawing board five times. I think that was critical. If we had kept the original structure it would not have succeeded. There was lots of cajoling.
One major issue on which firms could not agree, either within their own group or with the SEC, was on sales practices in derivatives markets. In particular, should firms disclose all major risks of transactions to institutional customers and counterparties (trading partners), or should the customers and counterparties be required to knowledgeably evaluate their own investment decisions? This volatile area of securities law involves judgements about relative responsibilities in complicated transactions between firms and sophisticated institutional investors (McCaffrey and Hart 1998). An attorney in the group observed, In some cases there was emotional disagreement, particularly in the area of customer relations. How do you set a standard that doesn't create legal obligations-not accepting that you're responsible for people's decisions and results? The issue is getting to standards that are meaningful but that don't lead to liability. Here you had a group of lawyers with different levels of concerns and commitment to the process. Some firms wanted it to happen, and others were less concerned and were very sensitive to the issue of liability. Also, the industry would have one view of liability, and regulators would have a different view. So how do you articulate general principles?
The firms settled on a statement that securities firms were not responsible for an institutional investor's investment decisions unless written agreements specified otherwise, but that firms should communicate this clearly to institutional investors and actively "clarify" any misunderstandings about responsibilities (Derivatives Policy Group 1995, p. 37). The SEC, in contrast, had pushed the DPG to design a generic risk disclosure statement. While the agency accepted the new reporting, risk assessment, and internal control procedures, it never endorsed the sales practice section.
The "end users" of derivatives, such as corporations and municipal governments, did not participate in the DPG. Involving the end users directly would likely have affected agreements in the areas of reporting, risk, and internal controls, as the controversial sales practice issue filtered into other discussions. Because they were not directly involved in the process, however, the end users 382 initially regarded the DPG warily at best and as illegitimate at worst (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997). One of our respondents, who admired the DPG's accomplishments, nevertheless observed, "the DPG was all very informal. If you hold it up to a good government critique, it would get criticized." The doubt that such an informal process could substitute for direct SEC action, and suspicion that the SEC could not enforce the agreement if the firms failed to comply, left the participants with little room for error during the agreement's implementation (Bureau of National Affairs 1995b). The Securities and Exchange Commission is one of the most highly regarded agencies in the federal government (Krause 1996 Yet it is striking how often the individuals we interviewed named one of these factors, and then stated that this factor would not have mattered if other factors were not present.
For example, leadership interacted with initial dispositions toward cooperation and incentives. The system of shared regulation had institutionalized both cooperation and confrontation as feasible options to deal with the derivatives issue (initial dispositions). When Thomas Russo advocated a cooperative government-industry initiative to design a new regulatory system for derivatives, and when SEC Chair Arthur Levitt supported the proposal, they cited examples of cooperation in financial markets as precedents (Russo 1994 ). Yet, Levitt easily could have chosen to assert the SEC's powers more confrontationally; interviewees noted that Levitt' s cooperative approach differed greatly from that of the previous SEC Chair, Richard Breeden. Thus, the decision reflected how leadership can influence the institutionalized options chosen. Furthermore, the key leaders managed effectively the conflicts within and among the organizations involved. It is important to remember, however, that Levitt, Rosen, and the other parties were successful in this partly because it was easier for them to manage the conflict within the small number and variety of groups than it would have been had the number and variety of groups been larger. Also, the economics, law, and politics of the situation generated the issues and incentives for those involved, but leaders played key roles in determining which of these were most prominent and how they would come into play in the process. Levitt's "carrot and stick" approach at the SEC; the mixing by Corrigan and Heimann of the public and private sector perspectives as co-chairs of the DPG; and Edward Rosen's management of the negotiations among the firms show the impact of leadership on the enactment of issues and incentives.
The interaction of incentives to cooperate with the institutionalized option of cooperation (initial dispositions) was critical. The shared regulatory system in the securities industry made cooperation a feasible option to deal with the derivatives issue, and the public and private sectors had incentives to try to make a cooperative process like the DPG work. In certain other areas of regulation, however, initial dispositions diminish the likelihood of cooperation despite incentives favoring it. For example, even modest reductions in the adversarial nature of rulemaking and enforcement in health and safety regulation would bring great benefits, but regulatory structures and traditions in health and safety regulation have inhibited such changes (McCaffrey et al. 1995, Weber 1998). The incentives to cooperate also made it more likely that the existing conflicts among the groups-already limited by the small number and variety of parties involved-could be overcome. Thus, the DPG was very much a product of how the four factors wove together. We will return to this theme in the paper's conclusion. An important question is whether the cooperative regulatory approach helped the OTC derivatives market develop while reducing its legal and economic hazards. Regulatory agencies' main challenge is walking a fine line between imposing rules that disregard the industry's operational needs, and not pushing industry enough to comply with regulatory laws. The advantage of the cooperative approach was that it enhanced the intelligence of the controls, relying heavily, with governmental oversight, on the financial firms' familiarity with operational details. The risk, however, was that the government could not enforce the controls directly. The subsequent development of the OTC derivatives market does suggest that the cooperative regulatory approach, despite its risks, is working effectively. An article reviewing the OTC derivatives market in the February 2000 Institutional Investor-a publication oriented to end-users-commented that "[t]he swaps market is considered more reliable than government bonds these days ... In its 20-year life span, the over-the-counter derivatives business has swung between celebrity and ignominy. Lately, it seems, the market has stepped into a dowdier, middle-aged role as a fullfledged corporate finance and investment management workhorse. It sure beats customer lawsuits and Senate hearings" (Clow 2000, p. 91) . Regulation, when it is operating effectively, fosters this type of stable growth.
Consequences of the Derivatives Policy Group
As noted above, a wide variety of industry stakeholders, including end-users who were originally suspicious of the DPG, now support the approach (United States House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 2000a, 2000b). We believe that the dynamics outlined in Figure 1 help explain this result. The private and public sectors developed a new type of working relationship in the context of the DPG. The project had little margin for error politically and legally during its implementation. The fact that the agreement was implemented in a goodfaith way, and that the parties had experience with how this regulatory relationship would work, justified a similar approach to deal with the hedge fund issue posed by the Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, and to respond more broadly to the growth of over-the-counter derivatives.
The DPG also was part of a move toward more cooperation internationally among financial supervisors. Technological, social, and economic changes have pervasively increased global interdependence. While financial markets have been linked for centuries, the ties today cover more activities more tightly than at any point in the past (Bordo et al. 1999) . A government trying to oversee and regulate financial markets internally knows that the firms it is trying to monitor can easily move money across borders in a variety of ways, and so must obtain the assistance of other nations, and global firms, in tracking financial flows. A major failure in one country can quickly spill over into other countries because the webs of international obligations and contracts are so dense (Reinicke 1998 Another respondent also referred to various efforts to try to develop "a DPG-like structure at the international level" (e.g., see Group of Thirty 1997, Russo 1999). We believe that the model outlined in Figure 1 could be used to examine these international developments; certainly the literature on regulatory relationships in international financial markets focuses on such factors. For instance, one central debate in that literature focuses on the extent to which key financial supervisors or representatives of international organizations shape policy (Haas 1992) , as opposed to being constrained by the initial dispositions established by distinctive national regulatory structures and traditions (Moravcsik 1998 ). Another debate asks whether economies are linked so tightly that the extant issues and incentives compel harmonization of international regulatory standards, or whether agreements will become unmanageable or meaningless as the number and variety of nations involved in negotiations increases (Financial Stability Forum 2000, Porter 2000). We cannot discuss these issues in detail here, but we believe-as our interviewees noted-that they involve internationally the same processes one saw within the DPG. Explanation of such international regulation, regardless of its outcomes, will require showing how all of these factors weave together.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how initial dispositions toward cooperation, issues and incentives, leadership, and the number and variety of active groups influenced interorganizational cooperation in the regulation of financial innovation. Most of the studies of cooperation cited earlier focus on how one or two of these four affect cooperation, with the other factors as background or residual considerations. Yet, initial dispositions, issues and incentives, leadership, and group size and diversity all affected the DPG in pivotal ways, as did their interactions; we do not see how any of these effects could be downplayed. This complexity presents real challenges for analysis (Larsson et al. 1998 , Parkhe 1993a . Literatures that have developed relatively independently-for example, on leadership, bargaining and negotiation, group dynamics, and institutional processes-all need to be brought to bear on the problem.
In the past century, several scholars have urged approaches to research that explicitly recognize the value of linking the worlds of professional practice and organizational studies (Graham 1996 , Sch6n 1994 ). We find this compelling, as obtaining a feel for how the four factors were linked required us to understand the economic, legal, and political details of derivatives regulation. For example, it would not be possible to understand the DPG's development and impact without understanding the reasons for the SEC's ambivalent attitude toward direct control of financial innovation, or the way that institutional investors came to evaluate positively the new approach to derivatives regulation. It is critical to understand the worlds of practice as experienced by the parties involved to understand the relationships among the factors that were so central to the developments discussed here. 
Appendix
